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British overseas investment was one of the most powerful forces contributing to rapid 
global integration before World War 1. Approaching half of this total was in the form 
of foreign direct investment, as British entrepreneurs increasingly located their 
activities away from the mature domestic economy to faster growing, less-developed 
regions. Weetman Pearson was one of the most successful of all Britain’s overseas-
based entrepreneurs of the period. Using original financial records, the paper shows 
how the Pearson group of companies became one of Britain’s most valuable industrial 
enterprises by 1919 having diversified from international contracting into the Mexican 
oil industry from 1901. The Pearson group highlights how British entrepreneurs were 
technically competent in managing large, complex infrastructure projects, able to 
navigate their way through various political systems, and adept at turning to 
whichever organisational form best suited their business interests; characteristics far 
removed from the outdated stereotype of the incompetent Late Victorian entrepreneur. 
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In October 1918, a month before Armistice, Calouste Gulbenkian, the Armenian ‘Mr 
Five Per Cent’ of the Russian oil industry, approached Weetman Pearson about 
whether Royal Dutch-Shell could acquire control of Pearson’s Mexican Eagle Oil 
Company. It wasn’t the first time Mexican Eagle had been the target of such an 
approach by the Anglo-Dutch oil major, but earlier attempts to merge had foundered. 
Indeed, Pearson had similar discussions with several potential suitors, with Jersey 
Standard in 1912 and 1913, for instance, and with the British Government, about 
creating a British oil industry national champion. But it wasn’t until the Shell Group’s 
straightforward offer for control of the company that Pearson cashed out. On April 
2
nd, 1919 Pearson reportedly received £10 million and Mexican Eagle became a 
subsidiary of the Shell Group.
1  
 
The acquisition attracted significant coverage at the time and was rightfully seen as a 
major commercial transaction of the day, so important that the United Kingdom 
Government had to give its blessing before it could proceed. But nevertheless the 
sheer scale of Mexican Eagle’s commercial success had barely begun to be 
acknowledged. It is not that Pearson has been omitted from the historical record. He 
has rightly been lauded as one of Britain’s leading entrepreneurs of the period. In a 
lengthy entry in the Dictionary of Business Biography, David Jeremy describes him as 
‘the leading contractor’ in the United Kingdom by 1914, for instance. Geoffrey Jones 
called him ‘The most brilliantly successful of all British oil entrepreneurs before the 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to Gabriel Leslie for translating several Spanish-language 
sources and to the journal’s referees for several valuable points. The usual disclaimer 
applies.     2
First World War’.
2 His later career as a prominent financier, newspaper owner and 
investor in overseas utilities developments has also attracted historians’ attention.
3 
Such prominence notwithstanding, when compared with his near contemporaries, like 
Lever, Nobel and Mond, for example, the scale and significance of his 
accomplishments has (it is proposed here) nevertheless been seriously underestimated.  
 
In part this is the outcome of Pearson’s own preference for retaining as near to 
complete control as was possible over a business empire that was mostly based 
overseas (and so away from domestic publicity), was held in private companies, and 
followed a conservative interpretation of financial reporting, which have left a legacy 
of only the most minimal amount of accurate information in the public domain about 
the true size of Pearson’s corporate empire.
4 But not only did the Pearson empire 
attain a far bigger scale than previously acknowledged, the significance of his 
activities deserves to be underlined because he represents so completely the emerging 
re-interpretation of British entrepreneurship in the Late Victorian and Edwardian 
periods. 
 
This sharply contrasts with the traditional version of the sapping of entrepreneurial 
dynamism, which, even in its recent, modified form, still declaims the impact of an 
ossified social structure and inept entrepreneurship. A recent synopsis concluded that 
‘In Britain there was too much inheritance…, insufficient luck…, and too little effort 
on the part of entrepreneurs to break out of existing paths of development.’
5 This is 
utter nonsense. Rather with opportunities at home sharply constrained by the 
inevitable consequences of industrial maturity and its lower rates of return, historians 
increasingly recognise that British entrepreneurs largely moved overseas.
6 With a vast   3
pool of savings and reliable and sufficiently transparent institutions in the City for 
their mobilization, British entrepreneurs were in a prime position to obtain finance for 
their overseas ventures.
7 Edelstein estimates that the value of British overseas 
investments was the equivalent of almost one-third of net national wealth by 1905, a 
far higher exposure than for any equivalent economy before or since: it was yet more 
by 1913. According to John Dunning, 40 percent of this was direct, not portfolio, 
investment. Corley’s recent re-working of the original figures suggests that the share 
of direct out of total British overseas investment might even have been as high as 45 
percent.
8 The net effect was that approaching half of the entire global stock of foreign 
direct investment in 1913 was owned and managed by British entrepreneurs, focusing 
on exploiting natural resources and infrastructure and using small, free-standing rather 
than fully integrated companies.
9 Evidence of the rates of return on overseas 
investments is scarce; most almost certainly lost money. But many became large and 
successful.
10 Entrepreneurial dynamism like this hardly constitutes any failure. 
 
Weetman Pearson typified this approach, exploiting the enormous advantages of close 
links to the London financial community to develop a range of business activities 
around the world, first in civil engineering, then in transport and in electricity 
generation, before, most spectacularly, in oil. These were organised within dozens of 
separate firms: some were free standing, others not; some listed on the London stock 
exchange, others in Mexico, others entirely privately owned and unlisted; the largest 
three operations were together a fully vertically integrated organisation employing 
many thousands. All were controlled by a single, privately-controlled, holding 
company. Using the original papers held in the Pearson Archives, this paper has 
attempted to overcome this undeserved obscurity through a partial reconstruction of   4
the complex financial arrangements between the different sister companies in 
Weetman Pearson’s group of firms. The result is to provide an estimate of the 
aggregate value of the group both before and at the time of the sale of the Mexican oil 
interests to Royal Dutch- Shell.  
 
It was the creation of this Mexican oil business that elevated the Pearson group into 
the top echelons of the British oil industry by 1919, along with Burmah, Anglo-
Persian and Shell. Burmah’s market capitalisation of £62.8m ($278m) somewhat 
surprisingly gives it first place on Chandler’s list of Britain’s leading industrial firms 
of 1919. Burmah produced and sold kerosene oil in Asia and entered a contract to 
supply to Royal Navy with fuel from Rangoon in 1905, which led to it being invited 
to take on the Anglo-Persian oil concession in 1905. After oil was discovered there in 
1908, the newly formed Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP) acquired considerable 
value, becoming the third largest industrial company in Britain in its own right, with a 
market value of £29.1m ($129m), contributing significantly to Burmah’s otherwise 
inflated value in 1919.
11 Shell Transport (its market value of £18.2m ($81m) made it 
the ninth largest firm on Chandler’s list) had earlier been Britain’s largest oil company 
after Marcus Samuel discovered oil in Borneo, but he did not possess the necessary 
organisational skills to create a fully integrated oil major. Shell increasingly 
foundered from 1901 until rescued by a merger with Royal Dutch in 1906, which 
allowed Henri Deterding to create Europe’s largest firm and the only serious rival to 
Standard Oil of New Jersey in the world oil industry.
12  
 
By 1919 the Mexican oil business had become so valuable that Pearson’s corporate 
empire was easily the equal of any of these. Yet almost paradoxically his entry into oil   5
represented something of a departure for the company. The article begins by 
describing Pearson’s early success as one of the world’s leading international civil 
engineering contractors by 1900, before going on to examine his 1901 entry and 
eventual success in Mexican oil, then presenting estimates of the value of the Pearson 
group of companies in 1913 and 1919. The article then concludes with a discussion of 
how Pearson illustrates the characteristics of British overseas entrepreneurship during 
the period.  
 
Origins 
Weetman Pearson (1856-1927) inherited control of his family’s teetering contracting 
business, S. Pearson and Sons Ltd., and began to turn it around. In 1884 he relocated 
its headquarters to London, and was soon claiming to be one of the largest contractors 
in Britain.
13 This growth came through major infrastructure projects on the British 
mainland. But with foreign governments increasingly able to raise funds in London, 
demand for new infrastructure was soaring overseas. In 1886 his first overseas 
contract was an imperial commission to build a dry dock in Halifax, Nova Scotia. At 
£270,000 it was the firm’s largest contract to date. It was quickly followed by the 
much bigger £950,000 contract for the construction of the Avila and Salamanca 
Railway in Spain in 1888, and then the £235,000 contract for the Hudson River tunnel 
in New York City.
14 
 
Along with its rapid growth, the nature of international contracting was changing as 
foreign governments shifted from offering concessionary agreements (where 
contractors got a share in the eventual profits) to more detailed and contractually-
binding deliverables.
15 The time to project completion and its associated final   6
payment (and avoidance of penalty clauses) therefore became the critical barometer of 
profits.
16 Pearson acquired a reputation for successfully managing projects of great 




Mexico: Infrastructure Projects  
Mexico saw the rapid economic development enjoyed by Argentina and Brazil in the 
second half of the nineteenth century largely pass it by. This was partly for 
geographical reasons, making its interior less accessible to railway development. But 
it was also a consequence of political instability. Prior to the autocratic regime of 
Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911), with 75 presidents in the 55 years since independence, 
Mexico had been a ‘classic case of a country locked into a coup trap’; economic 
growth had remained negligible.
18 While Díaz showed many of the unpalatable 
features of dictators everywhere, he did impose a system of property rights from 1883. 
Their distribution reflected his preference for rule by cronyism, but their creation led 
to state solvency and Mexico’s resumption from 1888 as a credit-worthy nation.
19 
Able to borrow on international markets, the Porfiriato had several development 
projects pending. Prime among these was the construction of the Gran Canal in 
Mexico City, to act as the city’s drainage and flood defence system.
20 
 
In his memoirs, dictated shortly before his death, Pearson recounted how he was left 
temporarily paralysed from tunnelling under the Hudson River in December 1889. His 
wife dispatched him to sunny Mexico to recuperate, whereupon (and despite initial 
reservations) he was persuaded to undertake the Gran Canal project.
21 No doubt he 
dined out on this story many times. But, as Priscilla Connolly’s detailed   7
reconstruction of events from archival evidence in Mexico confirms, Pearson was far 
more instrumental in gaining entry to Mexico than his anecdote implies. In fact he 
was  actively bidding with other foreign contracting companies for the Gran Canal 
contract. And his clinching position was not any superior technical ability but the 
‘repeated wishes of the financiers that the Drainage Board allocate the Canal work to 




This was no chauvinism on the part of British underwriters of Mexican bonds. Rather 
it was a simple consequence of Mexico’s fragile reputation in financial markets. With 
no track record for avoiding default and no collateral, when requesting investors to 
front up for assets with nil zero resale value (the Canal was just a hole in the ground) 
and nil productive return before completion, the Mexican government faced all the 
hallmarks of a classic credit market dilemma. With incomplete contracts opening up 
the possibility of non-repayment and the asymmetric distribution of information about 
the ability (and willingness) to repay, the lenders needed to devise techniques to 
monitor contractual progress through until completion. British bond holders insisted 
on the project employing a British contractor because such an intermediary could be 
hauled before investors and held to account over the life of the contract. Even if 
technically superior, French, German and American civil engineers would inevitably 
prove more slippery subjects to their financial masters.
23 
 
In fact Connolly demolishes the myth that Pearson was some sort of engineering 
virtuoso, showing how he struggled to complete the Canal project. He was subjected 
to close and critical scrutiny by the Drainage Board, which included several members   8
of the political elite, led by Finance Minister, Jose Limantour. From their archival 
record, Connolly suggests that as the project ran into difficulties from 1895, Pearson 
may have even lost money.
24 But despite breaching successive deadlines, he was 
awarded a second large contract in 1895, this time for £3 million to construct a 




The Veracruz contract was his platform for expansion and diversification in Mexico. 
Pearson was in fact more familiar with harbour and port construction than canals and 
could legitimately claim to be a genuine international specialist. Considerations of 
outside investors may well have swayed the Mexican Government’s decision to award 
him the contract, although the close relationship built up over the previous years’ 
completion of the Gran Canal is surely likely also to have played a role.
26 Pearson 
invested in mining, land ownership, electrical utilities and transportation in and 
around Veracruz. He collaborated with another leading international contractor, the 
Canadian F. S. Pearson (no relation) to develop the Mexico Power and Light 
Company, which brought electric power to the capital for the first time.
27 The 
contract’s real importance was, however, because it was during the early years of this 
project that Pearson was able to cement his role as a key intermediary for the Porfirian 
elite. 
 
In their explanation of how the Porfirian economy flourished, Haber, Razo and 
Maurer begin with the observation that Mexico did not enjoy rule of law. Rather they 
use the term vertical political integration to describe how a coalition of key asset 
holders and the political elite could have provided a stable polity and economic   9
growth superior to the stationary banditry of the preceding years. After the anarchy of 
the ‘coup trap’ era, Díaz integrated key members of the wealthy economic elite into 
the political process, enabling them to monitor the regime’s commitment to property 
rights (and so to their wealth). Díaz also encouraged his main political rivals, the 
regional political elites, to enter into business activities that were dependant on the 
continued stability of his federal government. State governors therefore moved from 
fomenting revolution to become third party enforcers of the system so that their rental 
incomes would continue. It was a system that could remain relatively stable as long as 
asset values and rental incomes continued to rise and the dispossessed masses 
remained quiescent.
28 Until the 1911 Revolution the latter condition held. The former 
depended on foreign intermediaries like Pearson, entering, bringing their expertise, 
and completing the major development projects that transformed property values.
29  
 
Pearson was far from alone. ‘Foreign investors poured nearly 2 billion into Mexico 
during the Porfirato’.
30 Somewhat belatedly Mexico had joined the international 
economy and was seeing the windfall from its nascent financial respectability. 
Foreign entrants like Pearson had to operate within the Díaz regime’s vertical political 
integration, which meant that key politicians needed to be induced to co-operate. So 
Guillermo Escandon, a leading federal governor, received a five percent commission 
on all monies received from the Gran Canal project. In time Díaz’ son, Porfirio Jr., 
was given a board position with the main oil business, and Díaz’ wife’s family were 
able to sell land around Veracruz to Pearson during the hunt for oil.
31   
 
Despite operating in a highly competitive market and despite (allegedly) charging 
relatively high prices, Pearson gained the lion’s share of major contracts. Traditionally   10
this combination has led Mexican historians to conclude that Pearson was able to 
exercise an undue degree of influence over the President. But Connolly notes that his 
allegedly ‘special relationship’ with Díaz  could not have been so close in reality. 
Despite opposition fomented in part by his American rivals, there is no evidence of 
Pearson engaging in any corruption.
32 His reputation in Britain was impeccable. Jones 
refers to him as ‘the most honest and incorruptible’ of British tycoons of the time. 




In fact with the costs borne mostly out of future duty revenues, and the impact on 
asset values (and rental income) so large after completion, Pearson’s price would 
mostly have been a secondary issue for the commissioning bodies. Pearson’s value to 
the regime was that he had demonstrated the ability to bring complex projects to 
successful completion. As Connolly states, where he ‘can take the credit is for having 
successfully completed the work to a high standard, unlike his predecessors.’
34 Given 
that large infrastructure projects had a minimal impact on asset values until after 
completion, the facility to bring such projects to a successful end was of enormous 
significance. By the early 1900s Pearson had completed the Gran Canal, almost 
completed the main Veracruz harbour project and was concentrating on the 
Tehuantepec railway project.
35   
 
Pearson himself felt the Tehunatepec railway project was one of the firm’s greatest 
technical achievements. He certainly was personally committed to it.
36 In terms of 
what was to follow, however, the Mexican railway construction was to prove 
particularly valuable for another entirely unrelated reason. The railway project gave   11
Pearson a familiarity with vast quantities of Mexican land. And it was his investment 
in Mexican land that enabled him to become one of the world’s most important oil 
barons of the early twentieth century. There were other important infrastructure 
projects in Mexico afterwards, but from 1901 onwards the focus of his business 
activities increasingly moved to oil. 
 
Mexican Oil 
Oil became an exceptionally valuable resource in the first decade of the twentieth 
century as diesel engine technology diffused and oil replaced coal in ships. Many 
American and European entrepreneurs entered this market; and a few enjoyed 
spectacular success. In Mexico there were three major contenders for dominance— 
Henry Clay Pierce, Edward L. Doheny, and Weetman Pearson.  
 
Pierce’s Waters-Pierce Oil Company was an affiliate of Standard Oil. It brought 
petroleum into Mexico and initially had a profitable sales monopoly. But in the first 
decade of the 20
th century Pierce suffered from competition, first from Doheny and 
then Pearson. Prior to moving south of the border, Doheny had discovered oil in Los 
Angeles and built a successful business in California. He expanded into Mexico in 
1901 where he established Huasteca, a petroleum production firm.
37 
 
Commercial oil production therefore commenced in Mexico in 1901. Output 
increased from a negligible 5,000 barrels in 1900-01 to a barely significant 12½ 
million barrels in 1911, before rising steeply to 26 million in 1914, 87 million in 
1919, 156 million in 1920, and 195 million in 1921.
38 By 1914 Mexico was the third 
largest oil producing company in the world after the United States and Russia; after   12
1917 it was ranked second. And it was Doheny and Pearson, not Pierce, who 
dominated the market. In 1914 Pearson alone controlled 60 per cent of Mexican oil 
output.
39 The early 1900s were, in other words, a propitious time to enter the Mexican 
oil business. And Pearson was well placed to enter. He already had substantial 
international business experience combined with deep local knowledge and 
Government favour plus a network of agents embedded in the region. But there was 
an element of serendipity that brought him to the right place at the right time. 
 
In April 1901, on his return from Mexico, Pearson missed a train connection and was 
stranded for nine hours in Laredo, Texas. The town had been gripped by “oil mania” 
since February when Captain Anthony J. Lucas had dramatically struck oil, with a 
100,000-bd gusher, at Spindletop.
40 In the midst of this charged atmosphere Pearson 
suddenly recalled a surveyor’s report of oil seepage in the vicinity of Pedregal, and 
another at San Cristobal in Tehuantepec. Pearson immediately set about to gather all 
the prospectuses in town in order to inform himself about the business. Within a few 
short hours he had cabled J.B. Body, his experienced manager in Mexico, with 
instructions to secure “…all land for miles round.”
41  
 
In a more detailed letter to Body he explained,  
“that oil deposits frequently extend over big areas, so the oil rights must 
extend over a large district to be really valuable. Ten, twenty, or forty 
thousand acres appears to be no uncommon size—so in getting the option, get 
it over as big a country as possible. A short option is no good. We must have it 
for a year at least—preferably two, as it would take time to put down an oil 
well or otherwise prove it.”
42   13
 
Pearson was initially motivated to invest in oil to supply his locomotives on the 
Tehuantepec railway.
43 But his ambition spiralled. During 1905 and 1906 he invested 
in substantial refining and transportation facilities, building a refinery, pipelines, and 
port facilities. Even at cost-price for the contracting firm, these represented enormous 
pre-emptive investments. He was gambling on discovering oil in Mexico.
44  
 
Test drilling continued through 1906 and 1907 but with no significant results. Pearson 
desperately needed some revenue to offset the sunk cost of the idle infrastructure. In 
1908 he tried to engineer an agreement with Waters Pierce to refine and ship their 




Finally in June 1908 the first large flowing well was struck. But this was soon 
followed by a disaster, when an oil strike caught fire and proved impossible to 
extinguish. The fire lasted for eight weeks and destroyed the entire field. Even 
someone with the depth of Pearson’s pockets was beginning to doubt the wisdom of 
events, as he recorded in 1908, with a note of regret: 
I entered lightly into the enterprise, not realising its many problems, but only 
feeling that oil meant a fortune and that hard work and application would bring 
satisfactory results. Now I know that it would have been wise to surround 
myself with proved oil men who could give advice that their past life showed 
could be relied on, and not, as I did, relied upon commercial knowledge and 
hard work coupled with a superficial knowledge of the trade.
46 
   14
Pearson continued without joy through 1908, desperately trying in January 1909 a 
final attempt to make a deal with Pierce.
47 But then drilling operations were extended 
north along the coast between Veracruz and Tampico, where on 27
th December 1910 
he struck ‘black gold’ with the Potrero
 No. 4 well gusher. It spewed forth 100,000 
barrels per day and took sixty days to cap it. In its eight year life it gave over 100 
million barrels.
48 Snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, it was the turning point in 
the company’s fortunes.  
 
Already before the First World War, the scale of Pearson’s Mexican business had 
become impressive, with: 
“concessions over 1½ million acres (about 2 per cent of the habitable area of 
Mexico), … 175 miles of pipeline, storage for 7 million barrels, and with a new 
plant at Tampico, two major refineries. Such an empire, before 1914, ranked as 
one of the great industrial combines of the world—small as yet beside the 
ramifications of Standard Oil, but, so geologists then promised, with as much 
potential as all the wells of Texas.”
49 
 
As output soared, new entrants were attracted to the Mexican fields. Doheny’s 
Huesteca and Pearson remained the leading contenders, still with a 61% share 
between them of the much bigger market in 1918. But by then dozens of new 
companies were contributing, including subsidiaries of the Texas Company, Gulf Oil, 
Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and 
Royal-Dutch Shell.
50 It was this boom in the Mexican oil industry, and his prime 
position in it, that enabled Pearson’s business empire to grow so spectacularly from 
1910 to 1919. But just how spectacular has hitherto remained elusive.   15
 
Valuing the Pearson group 1913 to 1919 
In part this obscurity is because of the sheer number of different subsidiaries in the 
Pearson group. All of Pearson’s investments in Mexico had initially come under the 
guise of the contracting firm, S. Pearson and Sons Ltd., which included major 
interests in several Mexican mines, railway, tram and electrical companies. But such 
was the rapid growth in the oil operations that a formal reorganisation needed to take 
place.  
 
The momentum for this had begun in 1909, when the Mexican Eagle Oil Company 
(Compañia Mexicana de Petróleo El Aguila SA.) was registered in Mexico, with a 
capital of first $30 million (Mexican) and then $50 million (Mexican), to take over all 
of S. Pearson and Son’s Mexican oil properties: the land and leases, the oil wells, the 
refineries, the pipelines, the tank farms and loading pipes and other port facilities. 
Mexican Eagle/ El Aguila was then responsible for all Pearson’s production and 
refining operations.
51 The 1909 incorporation of El Aguila as a Mexican company 
was apparently a quid pro quo for Government favours.
52 But a Mexican primary 
listing suited Pearson too, as it meant Mexican Eagle could enjoy a secondary listing 
on the London stock exchange without him either having to dilute his ownership or to 
comply with London’s stringent reporting requirements.
53 
 
The Eagle Oil Transport Co, was registered in the UK in 1912, and was the second 
element in Pearson’s Mexican corporate restructuring. It managed the transportation 
and distribution of oil outside Mexico and ordered twenty state-of-the-art tank 
steamers at once.
54 A third company, Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Co., was also   16
registered in the UK in 1912, and soon employed 800 people in Finsbury Circus 
House, London, becoming ‘the model of a well-run company’, to market Pearson’s oil 
outside of Mexico.
55 A fourth Pearson company, Whitehall Securities Corporation 
Ltd., was founded in London in 1908 to manage all of S. Pearson and Son’s other 
investments. In time this also became significant for the structure of Pearson’s 
Mexican oil business. S. Pearson & Co. then remained as the principal holding 
company (although its contracting business was formally hived off into a separate 
company, S. Pearson & Son (Contracting Department) Ltd., in early 1919). It was 
these companies that together represented the Pearson group in the years leading up to 
the sale of the Mexican oil business to Royal Dutch-Shell. 
 
Before the 1929 Companies Act there was no obligation on companies in Britain to 
publish annually and file with the Registrar of Companies a profit and loss account 
showing profit arising in that year.  A summary balance sheet to Companies House 
and a more detailed one printed for shareholders at the Annual General Meeting were 
all that was required by law.
56  But balance sheets might not report annual profits; at 
best, they might only show a balance for those profits accumulated over previous 
years and retained within the business. In fact the printed balance sheets for S. 
Pearson & Son Ltd at this time do not even show accumulated profits separately. The 
1919 balance sheet merely contains a single figure under the heading “Suspense and 
Profit and Loss Balances, after providing for Preference Dividend”, which could mean 
almost anything.
57  Pearson typified the outlook of most business leaders of the period 
in holding strongly the opinion that as little as possible information should be 
disclosed on financial matters, especially the amount of profit. He was not unusual in   17
Britain and his American and German peers typically disclosed even less 
information.
58   
 
Despite the complexity in the historical reconstruction of the group’s accounts 
(especially unpicking the commingling of Pearson’s private and corporate share 
dealings), the impact of Mexican oil on the value of the Pearson group of companies 
can be gauged by estimating the size of each of the principal Pearson companies 
involved. Historians have adopted several different indicators to measure a firm’s 
size, but perhaps the most useful (at least in capitalist economies) and most widely 
used is market value. It was a measure well understood by contemporary investors in 
the world’s stock exchanges.
59 Within the group S. Pearson & Son Ltd., was the firm 
most tightly controlled by Pearson himself. Whitehall Securities Corporation Ltd., 
Mexican Eagle’s financial agency, was wholly owned by S. Pearson & Sons. Mexican 
Eagle Oil Co. Ltd. had its shares listed on the Mexican and London stock markets. 
Eagle Oil Transport Co. Ltd. had all of its ordinary shares held 50/50 by S. Pearson & 
Son and Mexican Eagle. Finally Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Co. Ltd. was a private 
company and so its shares were not quoted.
60 
 
The net result is that using market capitalization alone will unfortunately render any 
measurement of the Pearson group incomplete, because several of its core companies 
were held under private ownership and so not listed. Any attempt to gauge the scale of 
the Pearson group therefore has to be a composite measure of market value and, the 
next best alternative financial indicator, its net assets, or its long term capital 
employed. 
   18
A privately circulated brief history of Mexican Eagle claimed that Pearson had 
invested £2.5 million in the Mexican oil business by June 1910, £3.75 million by 
December 1914 and as much as £5 million by April 1919. Total investment was 
somewhat greater. Pearson claimed in a letter (cited in the same source) to the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, in December 1913, that the total invested 
in the rapidly growing Mexican oil drilling business was £8 million. He went on to 
say ‘that the Transport Co.’s boats had cost £3,000,000 and that the Selling facilities 
[Anglo-Mexican Petroleum] would cost £1,000,000; making a total of £12,000,000 of 
capital invested.’
61   
 
Reconstructing the net assets from the 1913 balance sheets for the five companies 
gives a similar sum of some £11.4 million, made up as follows:  
 
Table 1. Pearson Group Net Assets 1913 (£m)
 62 
S. Pearson & Son     3.0      at 31 December 
Whitehall Securities     0.4      at 31 December 
Mexican Eagle     6.8      at 30 June (see Appendix) 
Eagle Oil Transport     1.0      at 31 December 
Anglo Mexican Petroleum   0.2      at 30 June  




Table 1 shows that there is some variation in the companies’ individual balance sheets 
with Pearson’s own account of the distribution of capital invested. The figures for the 
net assets for both Eagle Oil (at £1 million) and Anglo-Mexican Petroleum (£200,000) 
are much lower than Pearson’s claims for the £4 million invested in shipping and 
marketing, for example, and the net assets of the Mexican Eagle, valued at £6.8 
million in 1913, are also significantly below his own estimate of £8 million.  
   19
Plausible explanations for the differences might be that some of the cash outlays 
occurred before the formation of the limited companies (Mexican Eagle in 1909 and 
Eagle Oil and Anglo-Mexican in 1912) and so were left off their balance sheets but 
remained on the parent company’s balance sheet. And S. Pearson & Sons’ net assets 
were indeed dominated by ownership of the share capital subsidiaries, to the extent 
that despite significant revenues from civil engineering activities, its balance sheets 
scarcely give any indication that this was the world’s leading contracting business. A 
more likely explanation is that the variations simply indicate varying degrees of 
undervaluation. The group’s total net assets of £11.4 million reported in the published 
accounts of 1913 represent a conservative valuation of the £12 million invested in the 
Mexican oil business plus some unknown value of the global contracting business. 
 
The Pearson group had become a very large entity. Indeed, Pearson appears to have 
used its financial size as a means of impressing Lloyd George as to the strength of his 
group. Noting in his letter of late 1913 that £12 million had been invested, he went on 
to state that ‘the shares today notwithstanding the adverse conditions in Mexico stood 
at £5,000,000 premium’.
64 Aggregation of cost and premium implies a market 
valuation of £17 million for the oil business; presumably somewhat more if the 
contracting business was also included. This is at least 50 per cent higher than the net 
asset figure arrived at above, and suggests that the reporting of net assets in the 
published balance sheets for 1913 was indeed deliberately cautious.  
 
It also suggests that the Pearson group was already by then one of Britain’s largest 
businesses. Conservatively valued at $83 million (£17m), the Pearson group would 
have been Britain’s seventh largest and one of the world’s thirty largest businesses   20
had it been included on Schmitz’ list of the world’s largest industrial companies for 
1912, only a little smaller than Standard Oil (Indiana).
65 The Pearson group had 
experienced dramatic growth in the years immediately preceding 1913. It is doubtful, 
for instance, whether in 1904/5, before the major oil-related investments, the 
contracting business alone (plus the assorted transport, mining and so on investments 
in Mexico) would have given S. Pearson & Sons a value large enough to figure on 




Turning to 1919, at the point at which Pearson formally ceded control of Mexican 
Eagle to Shell, the reported net assets of the five companies had risen to £29.6 
million, as follows: 
 
Table 2. Pearson Group Net Assets 1919 (£m)
 67 
S. Pearson & Son    10.3      at 31 December 
Whitehall Securities        0.7      at 31 December 
Mexican Eagle    13.4      at 30 June (Appendix) 
Eagle Oil Transport        3.6      at 31 December 
Anglo Mexican Petroleum    1.6      at 30 June  
Total     29.6 
 
 
The net assets of Mexican Eagle, at £13.4 million, had doubled in six years. The net 
assets of S. Pearson & Son had, however, more than trebled. Eagle Oil Transport by 
1919 continued to be a large company in its own right for its single function of 
operating oil tankers, while the net assets of Anglo-Mexican Petroleum had grown 
greatly from its small beginnings in 1913.  
 
Compared with the combined net assets of £11.4 million for 1913, at £29.6 million 
the group’s net assets had nearly tripled over just six years. The Pearson group held   21
no significant debt at either date, so the increase in asset values may have come from 
ploughing back profits or additional outside investment. Wartime inflation had, 
however, led to more than a doubling of prices, so some of the increase may have 
been a revaluation. Indeed, the increase in the group’s net assets at constant prices 
over six years of what was a very rapid expansion in Mexican oil production emerges 
as a scarcely credible 18 per cent.
68 There is evidence in the company accountant’s 
papers relating to 1919 that the Pearson companies’ accounts significantly 
undervalued the Pearson group.
69 But the most significant adjustment in the 
company’s net assets was that the value of each Mexican Eagle share had been written 
down in 1918 or earlier to £0.48. This was a tiny fraction of its market value in 1919. 
The range of market prices in Mexican Eagle shares in 1919 was between a year’s low 
of £10.72 and a high of £11.87. The simple mean of these two prices is £11.30, or 
twenty-three times greater than the value listed in the balance sheets. In order to arrive 
at a more accurate value for the group, the value of Mexican Eagle therefore needs to 
be adjusted upwards using the mean share price for 1919, for the reported net assets of 
Mexican Eagle of £13.4 million in 1919 were dwarfed by the market’s valuation of 
the company’s shares at £62.6 million.
70 
 
Eagle Oil Transport also had its preference shares listed and their market value was 
£238,000 higher than the par value shown in the accounts of £2 million.
71 Together 
the market value of these two listed companies aggregates to £66.5 million, somewhat 
larger than for Burmah, the largest on Chandler’s list. Moving from a market 
valuation of part of the Pearson group to some sort of estimate of the value for the 
whole group requires the unlisted companies to be included. But there can be no 
market value adjustment as regards S. Pearson & Son Ltd, since that was a private   22
company.
72  Nor can the figures for Anglo-Mexican Petroleum or Whitehall Securities 
be adjusted, since their shares were not quoted either. But with no debt to dilute their 
value, it is very unlikely that any market valuation would have insisted on a discount 
to what were conservative valuations of the net assets. It seems not unreasonable to 
include the three unlisted companies’ net asset valuations in trying to come to some 
estimate of the overall value of the Pearson group, even while recognising that this 
may produce a somewhat more conservative result than any contemporaneous market 
listing might have. 
 
With the slight adjustment to the valuation of Eagle Oil Transport, the enormous 
increase in the market’s valuation of Mexican Eagle, and retaining the net asset values 
for S. Pearson & Sons, Whitehall Securities, and Anglo-Mexican Petroleum, the 
combined valuation of the Pearson group for 1919 is no longer £29.6 million, but the 
now rather more impressive figure of £79.1 million.  
 
Table 3. Pearson Group combined market valuation and net assets, 1919 (£m) 
 
S. Pearson & Sons    10.3 
Whitehall Securities      0.7 
Mexican Eagle    62.6  (£53.1m ordinary + £9.5m preference shares) 
Eagle Oil Transport      3.9 
Anglo Mexican Petroleum    1.6 
Total     79.1 
 
 
None of the Pearson group companies features in either Chandler’s list of the largest 
British companies by market capitalisation in 1919, never mind any kind of 
consolidated Pearson group.
73 But Chandler’s methodology based on share prices 
quoted in London has been followed here, so a direct comparison with his ‘200 largest 
industrial enterprises in Great Britain’ for 1919 is possible.     23
 
Table 4. Britain’s Largest Industrial Enterprises, 1919. 
     Market 
Value £m 
Sector 
1  Pearson Group  79.1  Oil & Contracting 
2 Burmah  Oil  62.8  Oil 
3  J & P. Coats  45.0  Cotton thread 
4  Anglo Persian Oil  29.1  Oil 
5  Lever Brothers  24.3  Soap & Fats 
6 Imperial  Tobacco  22.8  Cigarettes 
7 Vickers  19.5  Transportation  Equipment 
8 Guinness  19.0  Beer 
9 Brunner,  Mond.  18.7  Chemicals 
10  Shell Transport & Trading  18.2  Oil 
11 Nobel  Explosives  16.3  Chemicals 
12 Courtaulds  16.0  Textiles 
Source: Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 367 and Appendix B1, and text. 
 
On this basis, if the Pearson group had been included by Chandler, it would have 
emerged as the largest British company by far in 1919 with a value more than 25 per 
cent higher than Burmah Oil.
74  Comparison with Britain’s other leading oil 
companies gives the Pearson group a vastly greater value than both Anglo-Persian and 
Shell Transport. The Pearson group was much as 75 per cent more valuable than 
Chandler’s second largest company, J&P Coats.
75  
 
Exit from Mexico 
It has been widely recognised that Pearson’s Mexican Eagle was a major player in the 
global oil industry before 1919, yet it seems remarkable how little historians have 
understood of the true scale of his business empire. When Calouste Gulbenkian set up 
Shell’s takeover in 1919, it was in fact the merger of Britain’s largest company with 
Europe’s largest company, and evidently consolidated the resulting Shell group’s 
position as the only global rival to Jersey Standard.    24
 
That Pearson was able to see his Mexican oil business expand so greatly seems all the 
more extraordinary given the political turmoil into which Mexico had descended after 
1911. Given how easy it was (and remains) to sabotage oil pipes, that the near anarchy 
did not cause a precipitous decline in oil output needs some sort of explanation. 
Haber, Razo and Maurer suggest that with each of the competing factions depending 
on tax revenue to fund their military campaigns, no party had any incentive to do 
anything other than encourage the foreign oil companies to maximise output. Indeed, 
they suggest that the political factions and the oil companies were able to act almost 
as competing coalitions and discover stable equilibrium positions where the oil 
companies had sufficient incentive to continue to invest and produce and the political 
elites optimised tax revenues.
76 Investment continued apace. Over 4,300 oil wells 
were drilled between 1920-9, compared with only 442 during the 1901-19 boom. 
Royal-Dutch Shell through its newly acquired Mexican Eagle subsidiary also invested 
enormously in Mexican fields, the value of its net assets almost trebling in the first 
four years after 1919 (see Appendix Table A1). After he had sold out, Mexican 
Eagle’s market value continued to soar (it continued to have a separate listing – see 
Appendix Table A2) before falling along with the other majors as oil stocks lost value 
after 1920 – Jersey Standard saw its price collapse in 1922, the Texas Company also 
saw its stock price fall after 1922.
77 
 
The Mexican environment remained in fact relatively stable as long as the oil 
continued to flow and as long as the U.S. Government continued to support the 
interests of its oil companies in Mexico. Oil did continue to flow, although with 
growing difficulty after 1921 as the industry faced increasing geological problems in   25
its extraction, according to Haber, Razo and Maurer.
78 And the U.S. Government 
continued to support U.S. companies. But Pearson of course was not an American 
citizen. And so, perhaps ironically given the dramatic increase in the scale of his 
Mexican business interests, the Pearson group’s position after 1911 had become far 
more tenuous there than it had been before.  
 
From 1889 to 1911 Pearson had been the Mexican Government’s civil engineer of 
choice. The Díaz regime’s strategy of vertical political integration depended on 
continually rising asset prices and rental incomes to ensure the co-operation of its 
rival economic and political elites. Pearson brought the necessary contracting 
expertise and credibility with foreign investors. As the key intermediary, he 
undoubtedly acquired considerable influence. In contrast to the unflattering rumours 
spread by his U.S. rivals during the Díaz era, Pearson’s continued receipt of patronage 
was more because he was viewed by the regime as a highly competent, relatively 
trustworthy outsider. Employing such a relatively impartial outsider meant no 
individual faction would gain additional commercial and political clout and so 
threaten the polity’s fragile stability.  As a known entity, Pearson held an important 
political advantage over other competitors. Not only would he deliver, but he would 
not upset the fragile governing equilibrium.
79 
 
But the Revolution destroyed such equilibrium and there were no more civil 
engineering contracts. Had Pearson not diversified into oil, he would have had little 
cause to remain in Mexico. But his growing oil empire in Mexico gave him a strong 
incentive to remain, even while his contracting business continued to undertake major 
projects around the world after 1911. However, the role of (a highly selective) third   26
party enforcer in the new polity of anarchy for all bar the oil producers moved from 
the Mexican political elites to the U.S. Government. Pearson was increasingly isolated 
and his own position would appear to have become increasingly fraught. When the 
nationalization of oil deposits in the Constitution of 1917 put a strain on relationships 
with both the British and American firms, for example, it was only the American 
firms that had strong countervailing U.S. Government support.
80  
 
That presumably explains why Pearson was so eager for an exit route. The privately 
written short history written in 1928 details the various discussions Pearson held 
before selling out to the Shell group, beginning with a first approach by the Texas 
Company in 1911. Discussions with Jersey Standard in 1913 were discontinued 
because the Americans were unable then to pursue matters, although they resumed 
with some seriousness in November 1916. The British Government (with its military 
concerns then paramount) ‘urgently requested [Pearson] to discontinue our 
negotiations.’ But Pearson was becoming increasingly eager to sell out. ‘In reply we 
told the Government that we could not be expected to do this; that the state of affairs 
in Mexico was such that we should not be justified in continuing to shoulder the 
whole burden ourselves’. Pearson invited the British Government to take a half stake 
in the business, but its response in 1917 was instead to issue him with regulations 
restricting any ownership transfer during the war. Such a fiat was contested by 
Pearson; but Jersey Standard was nevertheless persuaded to postpone any possible 
acquisition until after cessation of hostilities.
81 Pearson also held discussions with 
Royal Dutch Shell representatives in 1912 and 1913, but the sticking point had been 
his insistence in cashing. As the end of war approached, Deterding approved the cash 
purchase for control, so that Shell could ‘assume the management and leave Lord   27
Cowdray with a perfect peace of mind.’
82 After nearly twenty years of building up 
such a large stake in the Mexican oil industry, he sold all his shares and reinvested the 
proceeds back into the global contracting business, in particular in electrical utilities 




‘Pearson luck’ was a phrase used by contemporaries to describe outrageous good 
fortune.
84 Certainly Weetman Pearson arrived in Mexico at a fortuitous moment. With 
the Díaz Government anxious to begin important development projects in the late 
1880s and financial credibility so fragile, Pearson’s reputation with British 
underwriters proved crucial in gaining the first contract. But fragility in Mexico was 
not restricted to its fiscal reputation in world markets. As Haber, Razo and Maurer 
explain, the stability of the Porfirian regime was also tenuous and depended on the 
continual rise in asset prices. After Pearson demonstrated that he could complete 
complex infrastructure projects, he became a key intermediary, an essential vehicle of 
expertise for the development of Mexican resources and their commercial exploitation 
by its political and economic elites. In this sense he was a beneficiary of what 
inevitably was only a temporary political system.  
 
The 1911 Revolution therefore meant that Pearson’s ‘luck’ ran out. His role as the 
Mexican Government’s civil engineer of choice ceased. After 1911 as the country 
slipped progressively into a near-anarchic state, the role of third party enforcer in the 
sole ocean of stability, the oil industry, switched to the U.S. Government, and so 
Pearson’s position became increasingly vulnerable and he wanted to sell out. But 
despite wanting to exit, his hands were forced first by Jersey Standard’s own legal   28
pre-occupations and then by the First World War. Yet during this enforced hiatus, 
Mexican Eagle had become transformed into ‘a most prosperous concern’.
85 Mexican 
Eagle continued to prosper as Royal Dutch Shell invested heavily, before the 
underlying geological conditions undermined the Mexican oil industry; an industry 
that Pearson had been instrumental in creating.  
 
Pearson’s example illustrates how British entrepreneurs moved overseas in search of 
higher returns in the decades after 1880. In particular they pursued complex 
infrastructure projects, constructing railways and ports for instance, and resource-
based investments, from land and plantations to mining and oil, all supported by 
finance raised in London. British entrepreneurs were participating in the extension of 
global markets through market deepening activities or through adding to the resource-
base of the world economy. Like Pearson, many were active outside the relative 
protection of the Empire and had to work with governments of greater or lesser 
legitimacy, in environments with less enforceable property rights. These were all 
market-driven activities. In this sense they were fundamentally different from the 
technologically-driven activities of those (often American or German) firms 
commonly associated with what business historians have called the second industrial 
revolution.  
 
Technologically intensive sectors as automobiles, electricals and chemicals were 
sectors that emerged largely without established markets for their new products. 
These firms needed to invest in managerial hierarchies in order to substitute for the 
galaxy of specialist intermediaries that fuelled the efficient allocation of resources in 
established markets. British entrepreneurs were no less innovative, indeed they were   29
collectively responsible for the bulk of integration of the world economy in the years 
before 1920. But, like Pearson, they operated in sectors that required less 
technological and more financial innovation and where markets and specialised 
intermediaries were long established. It made no sense here to invest scarce capital in 
managerial hierarchies. Management was no substitute for market coordination when 
transaction costs were low. Specialisation dictated the route chosen. ‘The 
entrepreneurial and management skills of the British lay in activities involving 
commerce, risk and short time horizons. These skills were of great value in their 
extensive extractive and service sector FDI before 1945.’
86 
 
The example of Pearson also shows that where British companies were in sectors 
where sufficient market failure dictated greater levels of internalization, like oil, they 
were able to invest in the appropriate organisational structure. The Pearson group of 
1919 may have resembled a complex conglomerate, with several free-standing 
companies active in overseas transportation, mining and electricity, as well as the 
fully integrated oil major and the global contracting firm, all under the control of the 
family holding company. But the efficiency and success of this organisation in all its 
fields has never been questioned. It reinforces the view that ‘British multinational 
activity could not have been sustained without considerable organisational 
capability.’
87 The Pearson case demonstrates that British entrepreneurs were just as 
able as their American or German counterparts to build vertically integrated, global  
organisations.  
 
British entrepreneurs did not fail during this period. Rather it was increasingly the 
case that they rationally moved their operations away from the slow-growing, mature   30
domestic economy to the faster growing areas of the world. Those who elected to 
remain wedded to domestic manufacturing (and who subsequently became the 
subjects of extensive historical scrutiny) were in fact increasingly unrepresentative of 
British entrepreneurship in the decades after 1880. Moreover, the criticism that British 
entrepreneurs were unable to build appropriate management structures appears 
difficult to sustain for this period. The truth is that in most sectors where most British 
entrepreneurial talent was focusing, such management-heavy structures were simply 
inappropriate and inefficient. Specialist market intermediaries could perform the 
intermediation tasks more efficiently. But on the rare occasion where British 
entrepreneurs were facing environments where internalization was the most suitable 
organisational response, like Pearson’s oil empire, they were able to create the 
necessary structures. Entrepreneurial failure and managerial deficiencies may well 
have characterised British business at some point in the twentieth century, but this 
article adds to a growing body of historical literature that refutes the stereotype of the 
incompetent early twentieth century entrepreneur. 
   31
 
Appendix Table A1:  Mexican Eagle Oil Co. Ltd: 
Growth in Balance Sheet Value of Net Assets, 1911-1923 (£m current prices) 
 
  1911 3.12    1916     9.03    1921 29.91 
 1912  3.92   1917  10.05   1922  36.70 
 1913  6.83   1918  11.02   1923  37.29 
 1914  7.28   1919  13.43 
 1915  8.09   1920  17.78 
 
Note:  data for 1911-20 are 30 June; for 1921-3 31 December 
Sources:  Stock Exchange Year Book and Official Intelligence, 1911-23. (And compare with Haber et 
al, Politics of Property Rights, Table 6.3, 218, on fixed assets.)  
  
 














Sources:  Stock Exchange Official Intelligence and Year Book 
Note:  Derived from average of highest and lowest share prices quoted in London, except for ordinary 
shares 1914-18 and preference shares for 1918, where ‘latest price’ from following year’s Stock 
Exchange Year Book was taken. (Compare with Haber et al, Politics of Property Rights, Table 6.10, 
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